GEORGIA-TURKEY (OTTOMAN EMPIRE) RELATIONS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND POST-WAR PERIOD (1918-1921)

ABSTRACT. A special part of the history of Georgia is the period of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921). At the end of the World War, the struggle of the great powers for the seizure of southwestern Georgia - especially the Batumi district - intensified. The economic and economic potential of the region, and its strategic location attracted both the Ottomans and the European states (England, France, Italy, and Russia). In the district, however, the plans of the supporters of Turanism to rebuild the earlier empire were not carried out. The defeat of the German bloc countries ruled out the possibility of Ottoman domination here. The UK took advantage of this and actively worked on establishing its prominent position in the region. For the same purpose, he tried to internationalize the Batumi issue, but due to the protests of the Georgian people and the diplomatic measures taken by the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, it was thwarted. In the background, Russia was noticeably active in both the Tsarists and the Soviets, which fought to maintain a united and indivisible empire. Nevertheless, quite intensive relations between the Russian National Council in Batumi and its commander, Cadet Maslov, and the famous General Denikin aimed to withdraw Batumi region from Georgia. The Angorie government was no less active in the same direction. In such a problematic situation, Adjara itself has taken the right position by having decided with the active support of the Government of the Republic of Georgia to pursue its future as a part of Georgia.

Another significant aspect to the research is the so-called Republic of Kars, which can be said to have been ‘stillborn’, but in its content was a real reflection of the most difficult political relations and battle of interests in the region. However, it was an extremely dangerous project on the territory of historic southern Georgia that posed a threat to Georgian statehood. This issue is virtually unexplored so far and is highly biased in its depiction in the works of historians of neighboring countries (Azerbaijan, Turkey).

Particular attention will be paid to the analysis of the political events in late 1920 and early 1921 in the context of the common Transcaucasian policy (referring to the agreements of Moscow, March 16, 1920 and Kars, October 13, 1921). Considering that Batumi region was one of the cornerstones of this great policy, a comprehensive research of the problem will be carried out with the help of new documentary sources discovered in the scientific circles and the archives in of Georgia, Turkey and Russia.

**Keywords:** Georgia; Turkey; Brest Peace Treaty, Russia, Angora Government, Kemal Ataturk

**JEL Classification:** M38; M39; M30
Introduction

The course towards Russia's exit from the First World War began to be implemented immediately after the Bolsheviks came to power.

On November 21, 1917, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L. Trotsky sent diplomatic notes to the ambassadors of the Entente countries with a proposal to stop hostilities on all fronts and start peace negotiations. As a result, in early December, peace negotiations between Bolshevik Russia and Germany began in Brest-Litovsk.

Having assessed the situation, the Entente missions began preparations for creating a government independent of Bolshevik Russia in the Transcaucasus, which is confirmed by a telegram from US Consul Smith sent to Secretary of State Lansing [1].

On December 3, 1917, in Brest-Litovsk, where the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the German troops on the Eastern Front was located (Germany offered the place of negotiations), negotiations began. On December 9, the first meeting of the official peace conference opened [2], ended on December 15 with the signing of an armistice agreement for 28 days, and on December 18, in the city of Erzincan an armistice agreement was signed between the Russian and Turkish armies, in connection with which hostilities on the Caucasian front were suspended [3].

We must also consider that Germany's ally, Turkey, also had its own specific goals in the Transcaucasus, and it had to try to solve them here at this conference. Obviously, Georgia was in danger of losing a significant part of its territories.

On January 1 (14), 1918, Lieutenant-General I. Odishelidze received a letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army, Ferik Vehib-Mehmed, stating that the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army, Enver Pasha, wanted to know "in what way it will be possible to restore relations with the independent Caucasian government, what proposals does the Caucasian independent government have to restore peaceful relations between both sides ... "To this end, Enver Pasha was ready to send a delegation to the capital of the independent Caucasian Government - Tbilisi, to achieve "the speedy restoration of a mutually desired just peace" [4]. (Although this telegram emphasizes (4 times) the status of an independent Caucasian government (in the person of the Transcaucasian Commissariat), this was not a sincere statement on their part. The fact that the Ottoman side at this stage did not consider the actual government of Transcaucasia to be legitimate and did not recognize it " de-iure", was clearly manifested at the very first meeting of the Trabzon Peace Conference).

In response, the Transcaucasian Commissariat informed the Turkish side that the Transcaucasian government was very interested in the speedy end of the war and the establishment of peace; however, at the same time, it considered "it is necessary to bring to your attention that we, being an integral part of the Russian republic, can start negotiations on world only after receiving the appropriate authority from the newly assembled Constituent Assembly " [5]. We share the opinion of Professor Mikhail Svanidze, Doctor of Historical Sciences, that if the Transcaucasian government did not recognize Bolshevik power, it should have more actively fixed its position and officially declared the independence of Transcaucasia. However, Noe Zhordania and his like-minded people still hoped that the Bolsheviks would not retain power in Russia for long, so they believed that there were no appropriate conditions for declaring the independence of Transcaucasia. Based on this, they did not even show proper attention to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty [6].

On March 3, 1918, peace negotiations ended in Brest-Litovsk. In accordance with paragraph 4 of this agreement, Bolshevik Russia had to fulfill everything that was required of it under this agreement. The treaty, as already noted, demanded a lot, and even a lot, from Russia. She was supposed to ensure a quick cleansing of the eastern provinces of Anatolia and the same quick return to their former owner. "The districts of Ardagdan, Kars and Batum will also be immediately cleared of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the new organization of state-legal and international-legal relations of these districts but will allow the population to establish a new system in agreement with neighboring states, especially Turkey"[7]. This
agreement also meant that the Russian-Turkish borders were to be restored in the form they existed before the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 [8].

In order to correctly assess this agreement, one must pay tribute to the words of Chicherin - "Here is the content of the agreement that we were forced to sign with a gun to our foreheads." [9].

**Methodological approach**

The methodological bases of the article is official data from central and local government agencies and the results of our research. Specific and general research methods defined based on the theoretical and empirical materials of the research aim at implementing the goals and objectives of the research. For the sake of the project, due to its content, as it relies on a broad and diverse database of written sources, descriptive, comparative-historical methods proven and established in Georgian and foreign science will be applied.

Consequently, the empirical base of the research includes: analysis of state-archival-museum, library documents and materials; analysis of press materials.

**Conducting research and results**

On February 16, 1918, the Transcaucasian Seim approved delegation's composition for peace negotiations with the Turks. I. Chkhenkeli was elected the head of the delegation. A program of action was also adopted there. The envoys were supposed to achieve a revision of the border to maintain the Russian-Turkish border of 1914 between Transcaucasia and Turkey.

The first official meeting of the peace negotiations took place on March 14, 1918. On the part of the Ottomans, it was attended by: the head of the delegation, Rauf Bey, Memed Nusret Bey, Dr. Tevpik Salim Bey, Professor of Istanbul University, Ismail Gami Bey, and others. and G. Lashishvili and others [10].

The Turks raised the question for the delegation to explain the form of political and administrative arrangement of the Transcaucasian Republic whether this form satisfies the conditions provided for international legal norms for the emergence of the state [11].

At the second meeting of the peace conference, AI Chkhenkeli characterized the form of the political government of the Transcaucasian republic. Transcaucasia will directly solve its problems with the neighboring state, and this should be the leitmotif of our meeting, said A. Chkhenkeli [12].

This consideration of A. Chkhenkeli was rather an expression of goodwill than a solid political argument. Transcaucasia had not yet declared independence, and at the Brest Conference, the Bolsheviks spoke on behalf of all of Russia. In our opinion, antipathy towards the Bolsheviks could not be suitable for ignoring the Brest Treaty. Because of these circumstances, the delegation in Trabzon encountered difficulties in defending their positions. According to Rauf Bey, their side arrived here not to consider the Brest Treaty, but to participate in new negotiations and had no other purpose than to prepare the foundations of economic and commercial relations, to determine the practical and technical details of these relations that were left without attention. in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk [13].

The Trabzon negotiations were at an impasse. The Turks considered the Brest Treaty to be the basis of the forthcoming agreement. The issue of the Kars, Ardagan, and Batumi regions is not subject to discussion at all, since the Ottoman Empire has the right to join them [14].

Transcaucasia could not positively resolve the issue of the absolute preservation of its territories. A variant of the transfer of a certain part of these territories was developed. The Ottoman Empire received the Kagizmansky region from the Kars region and Oltissky from the Ardagan region. With this combination, Georgia kept Potkkhov-Enusheti in the Ardagan region, which was equal to the territory of the Kars region left by Armenia [15].
On March 23, the Transcaucasian delegation presented a memorandum to the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was given: Oltisi - the southern part of the Ardagan region, Kagizman - the southwestern part of the Kars region [16].

The Turkish side went on a new maneuver - a memorandum was sent to Istanbul for review by the empire's government. This concluded the formal meetings.

According to Turkish historiography, the main goal of the Ottoman delegation in Trabzon was to maintain peace and stability between Turkey and its Caucasian neighbors. However, it is worth emphasizing that the rights of the delegates of the Ottoman side were limited to a certain extent. For example, the head of the delegation, Rauf Bey, appealed to his government with a request to expand his powers, which was not satisfied. For these and other reasons, the negotiations stalled, after which the delegation was forced to return to Istanbul [17].

On April 15, 1918, the Turkish side agreed to continue peace negotiations. This time, the city of Batumi, already occupied by Turkish troops, became the place for negotiations.

The Batumi conference touched upon all the problems connected with the settlement of territorial issues in relations with Turkey, in particular, the renunciation of Kars, Batumi and Ardagan. This action was to stop Turkish expansion. It should be noted that the work of the Trabzon and Batum conferences took place against the background of the influence of the Turkish side and military expansion, which aggravated the already difficult situation in the Transcaucasus. The Turkish side presented at the conference a draft treaty, which was of an annexation nature [18]. According to this project, Georgia lost all those territories that were returned due to the Russian-Turkish wars throughout the 19th century. These were the territories of the Ardagan and Batumi districts, the territories of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe. Thus, Georgia's political and economic situation was violated [19]. The Turkish side presented this project as a final agreement.

On May 25, 1918, the Transcaucasian delegation received an ultimatum from Khalil Bey. They had to fulfill all conditions within 72 hours, the most important of which was changing the borders in favor of Turkey [20].

On May 26, 1918, Georgia declared independence. As an independent state, on May 28, Georgia signed the first treaty with Germany, which outlined the priorities of relations and actions. Germany de facto recognized Georgia. There were hopes and some guarantees of the territorial integrity of the state, but it should be noted right away that Georgian-German relations were determined by the conditions of the Brest peace, which was recognized by both sides [21]. It was after this, on June 4, 1918, that the Batumi Treaty and a friendly agreement between Georgia and Turkey were signed, based on which the new territory from the Choloka River to Abastumani (borders after the Russian-Turkish war of 1877), now reached the Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe districts, crossing to Turkey [22]. Thus, the Ottoman Empire regained the so-called "Great Vilayet of Gurjistan" [23]. Thus, this agreement represented a political and diplomatic defeat for Georgia. After the occupation of Batumi, the Turkish government tried to use the conditions of the Brest peace in its favor, in particular, it demanded that the local population determine their future status and for this purpose, held a referendum in order to give the occupation a legal basis.

Germany did not agree with the referendum (there were many violations). This was not a surprise, since the Turkish Transcaucasian policy no longer considered the conditions of the Brest Peace. At the same time, Germany did not want to lose its authority in the eyes of the Georgian government. In a note sent to Istanbul, it was emphasized that the conditions of the Brest peace were violated [24]. Later, the government of Soviet Russia responded to this document. A protest note sent on September 20, 1918 emphasized that the local population did not use the conditions stipulated in the Brest Agreement to establish new orders in these territories [25].

Sultan Turkey suffered a heavy defeat in the First World War. On October 30, 1918, she signed an armistice agreement under which the Entente armed forces occupied Istanbul and the most important cities of southern and western Anatolia. Under cover of the Entente warships, Greek troops landed in Izmir.
policy of destruction of the Turkish statehood, and the open division of the territory of Turkey itself began. But the Turkish people did not reconcile themselves to the prospect of enslavement, a stubborn national liberation struggle against the invaders started, it was headed by a patriotic part of the national bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and, in particular, the officers. Soon, the young brigadier general Mustafa Kemal Pasha emerged from the sphere of senior officers as the leader of the national liberation movement, and he became the leader of the struggle of the Turkish people for their independence [26]. Independence of the Turkish state and declared itself the only legitimate authority. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was elected chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and head of the Turkish government.

In the fight against the countries of the Entente, the government of Mustafa Kemal took a course towards rapprochement with Soviet Russia. June 2, 1920 may well be considered the date of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and Turkey, although the first official contacts between representatives of the RSFSR and Turkey took place on July 19, 1920, when a Turkish government delegation headed by Foreign Minister Bekir Sami arrived in Moscow.

In our opinion, the alliance concluded by the Russian government with the government of Mustafa Kemal was based not only on the utopian idea of a world socialist revolution. The new foreign policy course primarily implied streamlining the problems of the Caucasus in the interests of Russia notably the accession of the Transcaucasian states to Russia through their Sovietization... [27]. In this strategic plan, Turkey also occupied a specific place, reflected in subsequent events. The Turkish government was well aware of the severity of the situation. In this regard, the information of the commander of the 15th corps of the Turkish army, Karabekir, is interesting, which indicates that the commander of the 3rd corps, in a frank conversation with the representative of Great Britain, said that the Turkish side, after the withdrawal of the British occupying forces from Georgia, should show firmness in relation to the eastern borders of the country and the city of Batumi [28].

On April 26, 1920, in a note sent to the Soviet government, the Angora government raised the issue of the Batumi region.

In its response dated June 3, 1920, the Soviet side promised Turkey, fighting against the Entente, complicity for cooperation, but about the Batumi issue, it did not agree and did not reject the demand of the Turks [29].

the treaty, according to which Batumi and the territory adjacent to it are considered an indivisible part of Georgia (the peace treaty between Georgia and Soviet Russia of May 7, 1920 was implied)

Georgy Chicherin, in his reply, explained to Russian Ambassador to Georgia Sergey Kirov that in the note addressed to Kemal Pasha, the quote about Batumi was taken from the resolution of the Great National Pact of Angora and does not reflect the opinion of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of Russia. As you can see, relations between the Russian leadership and the government of Mustafa Kemal have entered a new stage of activity. Although the peace initiative of the Turkish government and the first step in establishing diplomatic relations with the neighboring country were very encouraging, it was clear that another "key" to peaceful relations was in the hands of the northern neighbor. Unfortunately, this was a reality that the Georgian government did not pay due attention to.

As we see, in the issue of relations with Georgia, Soviet Russia assigned a certain place to the Batumi issue. In light of this, the appeal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian 11th Army Gecker dated December 18, 1920 to the chairman of the revolutionary military council is of great interest.

The appeal noted: “If the military council of the 11th army receives firm guarantees of a friendly attitude towards us from the army of Kazim Karabekir, then the issue of the occupation of Georgia and Tbilisi will become more real” [30]. Russia’s relations with the Kemal government entered a new stage of activity. Based on this, it was considered inappropriate to present claims to Georgia on the territorial issue by Turkey at this stage. The issue of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries was on the agenda. On November 13, 1920, the official representative of the government of Ankara, Colonel Kazim Bey, arrived in Georgia. At a meeting with representatives of the Georgian press, he stated that "the
government of Angora wants to see Georgia united and strong, and that Georgia has earned our sympathy” [31].

The Georgian public was very optimistic about the initiative of the Turkish side, but did not lose a realistic perception of the situation. The basis for good neighborly relations between Georgia and Turkey was the recognition of Georgia's independence within limits established by the Russian-Georgian Treaty of May 7, 1920. As a result, the opinion of the Georgian public was formulated as follows: “We believe in the promises of Angora, the friendly hand extended by Mustafa Kemal Pasha will not hang in the air” [32].

On January 31, 1921, a Georgian diplomatic delegation arrived in Turkey. At that time, the Consul General of Turkey visited Tbilisi. The Georgian delegation was quite representative. On February 8, 1921, the Georgian ambassador visited Mustafa Kemal on an official visit. How did the sons of the future Republic of Turkey imagine relations with the neighboring country? This is well formulated in Ataturk's reply: “We are united with Georgia not only by mutual sympathy but also by the unity of goals. We need a strong and independent Georgia” [33]. Unfortunately, subsequent events, caused by several objective and subjective factors, did not fully confirm these good wishes. However, it should be noted that in the neighboring country there have always been supporters of the above idea of Ataturk (meaning the positive attitude towards Georgia of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the government of Angora Bekir Sami). February 8, 1921, was the date of de jure recognition of Georgia by the government of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

On February 11, 1921, the Red Army invaded Georgia. On the second day after the Red Army invaded Georgia, the ambassador of the Angora government in this country, Kazim Bey, decisively declared:

“It is in our interests to cooperate with independent Georgia, and to achieve this goal, we will not even give up the war against the Bolsheviks. This is the opinion of our government.” [34]. It should be noted that this statement of the Turkish ambassador was only an expression of his personal point of view.

The chairman of the government of Georgia, N. Zhordania, had an illusory hope for solving the problem of Russian-Georgian relations with the help of Turkey. Therefore, the Georgian ambassador in Ankara, Svimon Mdivani, was instructed to urgently start negotiations on this issue with the government of Kemal Pasha. The following days of negotiations were intense. Gradually it became clear what the Turkish side wanted from Georgia. The current situation has given a special shade to the Georgian-Turkish relations. The Turkish side made the first territorial claims on February 18, 1921. She demanded that Artvin and Ardagan be handed over to her.

In this regard, in a note of protest, Svinon Mdivani pointed out: “... Your planned actions to bring troops into Ardagan and Artvin without agreement with us are a repetition of the historical mistake due to which Ottoman Turkey forced Georgia to seek support in the face of Russia with continuous attacks...” [35].

Of particular interest is the telegram of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Kote Sabakhtarishvili, to Svimon Mdivani dated February 18, 1921, from which it becomes clear that to preserve Batumi and the Batumi region, Georgia was ready to cede the Ardagan and Oltis regions to Turkey. Furthermore, the Georgian ambassador was given instructions on what territories Georgia could cede at the moment. Such territories could be the regions of Ardagan and Oltis. But the Turkish side was not satisfied with this and additionally demanded the transfer of the Artvin region and a plebiscite in Batumi.

Accordingly, this circumstance created a peculiar background in Georgian-Turkish relations. In addition to territorial claims, the Turkish side demanded a nominal plebiscite in the Batumi region. Thus, the Turks added a new demand - a nominal plebiscite and the transfer of the Artvin region [36]. In a note handed over to S. Mdivani by Deputy Foreign Minister Mukhtar Beim on the transfer of Ardagan and Artvin, it was clearly stated that the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the eastern front “received directives to ensure the return of the indicated territories to the homeland” [37].

Georgia could not fight on two fronts. It was decided to throw all forces into the fight against the Bolsheviks, so on February 20, 1921, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Georgia ordered the withdrawal of military units from Artvin and Ardagani [38]. Turkey’s claims were not limited to this.
In his note addressed to Georgy Chicherin, the Turkish Ambassador to Russia, Ali Fuad Jebesoy, explained the occupation of Ardagan and Artvin by the Turks as a very natural consequence of the provision of the National Pact Turkey concerning the three border sanjaks. In the ambassador's opinion: "This occupation takes on the significance of the material assistance provided by the Turkish army to the Georgian workers fighting for their liberation against the Menshevik government" [39].

The Democratic Republic of Georgia government was forced to leave Tbilisi and go to Kutaisi, completely isolated; in search of a way out, it made more and more mistakes. The demands of the Turkish side grew rapidly. After the capture of Tbilisi by the Red Army, Kazim Bey turned to the commander-in-chief of the eastern front of Turkey, Karabekir, with a proposal to take Batumi [40].

On March 2, 1921, this issue was considered by the Turkish General Staff. As a result, they decided to occupy Batumi, Akhalsikhe and Akhalkalaki. For this purpose, the Chorokh group was created [41]. At the same time, on March 4, the Turkish government sent a telegram to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Russia, Georgy Chicherin, asking that the Red Army units that invaded Georgia not enter the areas mentioned above. “I ask you, in order to maintain mutual friendship between the two Governments and to eliminate all kinds of reasons for friction between the Red and Turkish troops, give a categorical order to the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army operating in Georgia in order to prevent the entry of his detachments into the areas lying next to our borders, and equally to the regions of Akhalsy and Akhalkalaki” [42].

Despite the fact that the Turkish side refrained from helping Georgia in military operations against Soviet Russia, the government of N. Zhordania, which fed on illusions, on March 4, on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, drew up a particular letter, according to which the Ambassador of Georgia was given instructions on further actions. According to these instructions, the Georgian government, in return for help in the fight against Moscow, agreed to the occupation by Turkey of the Batumi region and the Akhalsikhe and Akhalkalaki districts so that civil administration and sovereign rights of the Georgian government would be preserved here. Under such conditions, the Georgian army would even assist the Turkish army in occupying the above areas [43]. It can be seen from the above that the government of Noe Zhordania, in order to preserve its own power and the sovereignty of the country, did not refrain from extreme adventure.

On March 6, 1921, Kazim Bey sent a telegram from Kutaisi to Ankara's government. He reported that the government of Georgia agreed that the Turkish army occupied Batumi Akhalsikhe and Akhalkalaki. Thus, finding itself in a hopeless situation, the Georgian government allowed the entry of Turkish troops into Georgia [44]. On March 9, 1921, the Turkish General Staff ordered Kazim Karabekir Pasha to occupy Georgian territories and prevent the entry of the Red Army into Batumi [45]. On March 11, the Turkish army entered Batumi. Despite the fact that, according to the decision of Moscow, Batumi was to remain part of Soviet Georgia, the advance of the Ottoman troops continued. On March 10, after the capture of Artvin and Ardagan, Turkish troops approached Batumi. Georgian army units were located in Batumi, consisting of 3,000 soldiers and 10,000 soldiers who fought on the front of Sajavakh (Western Georgia.). The panic in the city caused the enemy to advance rapidly. Askers under the command of Colonel Kazim Bey appeared on the streets of Batumi. Overcoming weak resistance, the Turks occupied the main state facilities, and Kazim Bey proclaimed himself the governor-general of Batumi and the entire district. This forced the government of Zhordania to negotiate with the Bolsheviks in order to defend Batumi with joint forces. To do this, Grigol Lortkipanidze was sent to the Georgian Revolutionary Committee in Kutaisi, and the Georgian troops stationed on the Rioni River were ordered to let the Red Army soldiers through. All the hostages were released from the Batumi prison under the leadership of the Bolshevik Sergo Kavtaradze. In a conversation with S. Kavtaradze, N. Zhordania outlined the current situation and called for effective measures but saving the city.

The entrance of the Red Army was delayed for various objective reasons, and time was running out. At a time when the issue of saving the homeland was acute, the Georgian military units with amazing courage, selflessly rushed to the enemy. The well-known personnel general Georgy Mazniashvili was
appointed commander. In a short time, combat-ready formations were formed from the disintegrated parts of the Georgian army, next to which stood ordinary citizens. Under the leadership of Ahmed Kikava, Abdul Tkhilaishvili, Osman Mikeladze and other patriots of Georgia, parts of the people's guard were created from the local population, which fought along with the remnants of the troops of democratic Georgia. Military operations in the city developed in two directions. In the direction of Kakhaberi, they were led by General Varden Tsulukidze and in the direction of "Stepanovka" and "Forts of Anaria" by General Data Artmeladze.

Consequently, as a result of the heroic battles on March 18-19, Batumi was cleared of enemy troops and avoided great danger. Kazim Bey's adventure failed and he was forced to leave Batumi along with his military units. In Batumi, with the help of military units of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, the establishment of Soviet power was completed.

On February 18, 1921, a Turkish delegation arrived in Moscow. The parties were in no hurry to start negotiations. The main text of the Russian-Turkish agreement was announced on August 24, 1920, only the question of the Russian-Turkish border in the Caucasus remained to be resolved. On March 16, 1921, the Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood between the RSFSR and Turkey was signed in a solemn atmosphere. According to this document, the Soviet government ceded to Turkey the areas of Kars, Ardagan and Artvin. Turkey renounced in favor of Georgia from "... suzerainty over the port and city of Batum and the territory lying north of the border specified in article one of the current treaty and forming part of the Batumi district" [46]. At the same time, an agreement was reached on the provision by Soviet Russia of assistance to Turkey in money (in the amount of 10 million gold rubles) and military materials.

In our opinion, the 15th article of this treaty can be considered nonsense. Russia assumed the obligation to take the necessary steps in relation to the Transcaucasian republics to force them to recognize the articles directly related to them [47]. At the time of the signing of this treaty, the Menshevik government of Georgia was still in the country. Only on March 18 did it leave Batumi with the hope that the emigration would be short-lived. Unfortunately for them, this hope did not come true.

On October 13, 1921, with the participation of the RSFSR, a friendship agreement was concluded in Kars between Turkey, on the one hand, and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, on the other. The Russian factor played an essential role in preparing and signing an important document that established the inviolability of Turkey's northeastern borders. We share the opinion that exists in Georgian historiography that the Kars Agreement was a direct continuation of the Moscow Agreement of March 16, 1921. According to international law, this was his shortcoming [48]. But the most important thing is that Georgia was able to save Batum and the Batumi region. We share the opinion of the prominent Georgian historian Professor L. Toidze, who rightly believed that the legitimate solution to the issue of Batumi and the Batumi region (as an indivisible part of Georgia) was due to the firm and unshakable position of Soviet Russia [49].

Conclusion

Thus, based on the analysis of the above materials, it can be concluded:

1. After the restoration of Georgia's independence, the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia tried to preserve the territorial integrity of the country within its historical borders, although this was extremely difficult to achieve in the then difficult internal and external conditions.

2. The leadership of Georgia sought to preserve the realities of the border regime that existed between the Russian and Ottoman empires before the First World War, which the Ottoman Empire categorically opposed. Chief among them was the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, drawn up under Georgia's difficult and unfavorable conditions.

3. In the autumn of 1918, the positions of Ottoman Turkey in Southwestern Georgia were seriously shaken. Defeated in the World War, Turkey tried to regulate relations with the neighboring Georgian Republic. At the end of October 1918, Tbilisi was officially informed about the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Batumi. The current political situation dictated this move by Turkey. Having suffered a defeat in battles
with the Entente, on October 30, 1918, Turkey signed a temporary agreement with England in the port of Mudros, according to which she had to leave all the occupied territories.

4. The provision of assistance to the new Turkey also contributed to the strengthening of the positions of Soviet Russia in an extremely important region. At the same time, the friendly alliance concluded by Russia with the government of Kemal Pasha implied the implementation of a new Russian foreign policy. At this stage, the Angora government also benefited from close relations with Bolshevik Russia, so it is not surprising that it was sympathetic to Russia’s plans for the Transcaucasus.

5. By the end of 1920, the situation that had arisen forced Russia to abandon its open occupation of Georgia. Moreover, the Soviet government called on Turkey about Georgia to take into account the peace treaty between the Georgian Democratic Republic and the RSFSR of May 7, 1920, according to which the Russian side recognized the integrity and independence of Georgia (according to this treaty, the Batumi region was part of Georgia). Therefore, "The Soviet Government would consider it more desirable from the point of view of the interests of Turkey and Russia to conclude a peace treaty between Georgia and Turkey based on the Russo-Georgian Treaty."

In conclusion, it can be said that the wrong political course of the Entente towards Turkey, developed after the end of the World War, implying the collapse of the Turkish state, not only contributed to the start of a powerful national liberation struggle under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, but accelerated the rapprochement between Soviet Russia and Turkey. Relations between Russia and Georgia, Georgia, and Turkey during the analyzed period resulted from a difficult international situation.
References

Central State Historical Archive of Georgia (TSGIAG), fund 1818, inventory 2, file 116, sheet.12.
Documents and materials on the foreign policy of Transcaucasia and Georgia, Tb., 1919, p. 18-23.
Documents and materials on the foreign policy of Transcaucasia and Georgia . Doc. №15, p. 24-25.
Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR (1957), Volume One, Moscow, “Nauka”. p.121.
Ibid, p. 201.
Ibid, p. 672-673.
TSGIAG, fund 1819, inventory 1, file 17, sheet 13.
TSGIAG, fund 1819, inventory 1, file 17, sheet 16.
TSGIAG, fund 1819, inventory 1, file 17, sheet 19.
TSGIAG, fund 1819, inventory 1, file 17, sheet 25.
TSGIAG, fund 1819, inventory 1, file 17, sheet 28.
TSGIAG, fund 1818, inventory 2, file 179, sheet 10-14.
TSGIAG, fund 1836, inventory 2, file 73, sheet 4-5.
Documents and materials on the foreign policy of Transcaucasia and Georgia, doc. №159, p. 309-310.
Documents and materials on the foreign policy of Transcaucasia and Georgia, doc. No. 172, p. 343-349.
Zosidze N. From the history of Georgia's diplomatic relations with Turkey (letters from Svimon Mdivani) // Historical Bulletin, XIV, Bat., 2005 (in Georgian). p. 32.
Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Arşivi, BEO 346469, c. 19.
Nozadze B. For the Recovery of Georgia, the Fight for Meskheti,Tbilisi1989, p.93.
Newspaper ,,Sakartvelo”, 24.11.1920.

TSGIAG, Harvard Foundation 386, sheet 2.

Zavriev D. K. Contemporary History of the North-East Vilayets of Turkey, Tbilisi., 1947, p.103.


Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, (1959), Volume three, Moscow, “Nauka”, p. 556.


Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, (1959), Volume three, Moscow, “Nauka”, p.515


Svanidze M, named work, p. 179.

Svanidze M, named work, p 182.

Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, (1959), Volume three, Moscow, “Nauka”, p. 598.

